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Introduction
Our main concern in this book is to show how the parent-child relationship, the 
importance of which is universally acknowledged, has been claimed by certain 
languages and forms of reasoning, to the extent that it has become difficult to find 
other ways of talking about it and exploring its significance, at both an individual 
and a societal level. There is, in fact, an intentional ambiguity in the title The claims 
of parenting. First of all, this is meant to capture the idea that parents today have 
various claims made on them in the sense that they are expected to perform in 
certain ways and to achieve certain outcomes. Moreover, and connectedly, there are 
the various claims, in the public domain, about parents and parenting. And finally, 
there are the claims of parenthood, in the sense of what it is that parenthood demands 
of us when we come to see it as a human activity in a rich ethical sense of the word. 
Importantly, this ambiguity is reflected not just in our conceptual distinctions but in 
our lived experiences, where, as we discuss throughout the book, these very distinctions 
can often become blurred in the sense that the claims that are made about and on 
parents can eventually become claims that are made by parents themselves, as parents 
gradually come to see themselves in the ways implied in the predominant languages 
of ‘parenting’.
We begin by exploring and discussing some examples of these languages, the 
most prominent of which are the languages of psychology, particularly certain forms 
of developmental psychology, that have come to dominate popular and policy litera-
ture about and for parents in a very particular way, with significant implications for 
how we talk and think about childrearing and the parent-child relationship. The 
focus of the first chapter of the book, and the basis for the thematic discussion which 
we take up again in later chapters, is an account of the conceptual and ethical aspects 
of childrearing and the parent-child relationship that are suggested by and, perhaps 
more importantly, that are left out by, these dominant ways of speaking.
Our starting point for this exploration is the present experience of being a parent 
at a particular moment in history and in a particular part of the western world. While 
our discussion is primarily philosophical rather than historical or sociological, we 
make no claims to universality; indeed, it is part of our argument about the parent-
child relationship that this relationship is always situated within and mediated by 
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particular contextual values and meanings. Nevertheless, there are, we believe, certain 
significant and troubling features of our current dominant ways of talking about 
childrearing and the parent-child relationship that represent a particular emphasis 
and understanding, and that raise important questions worthy of rigorous philo-
sophical exploration. These are manifested and reflected in the current proliferation 
of advice, manuals, classes, literature and TV programmes aimed at parents, which 
go hand in hand with an unprecedented burgeoning of policy initiatives in the area 
of families and parents. More often than not, these initiatives are explicitly designed 
to address perceived problems such as lack of discipline amongst children, a rise in 
teenage pregnancies, increasing levels of drug and alcohol abuse amongst teenagers 
and children, eating disorders, childhood depression, and so on – at the root of 
which, it is claimed, are issues to do with how parents relate to their children. 
In short, ‘parenting’ is on the public agenda. And while it is certainly true that experts 
and literature on childcare have been around for a long time, the normative assump-
tions and the logic of the arguments behind the language in which parent-child 
relationships are, overwhelmingly, addressed in our current climate, represent a 
significant shift in emphasis. This is, perhaps, most evident at the policy level where, 
whether through parenting support classes, ‘parenting orders’, or proposals for 
‘home-school agreements’, and the like, there seems to be a growing consensus that 
accumulative evidence has indicated the undisputed role of early parenting patterns 
on children’s social, emotional and intellectual development, and that to abstain 
from intervening in family life in order to disseminate this evidence and optimise 
outcomes accordingly would amount to a moral and political failure. It is, indeed, 
the very ubiquity and moral force of this consensus and of the scientific language on 
which it relies, that, we argue, makes it difficult to critically examine the evaluative 
and conceptual assumptions behind this language and to think about the parent-
child relationship in different terms, drawing on different languages.
Many sociological, historical and cultural stories can be and have already been 
told about why it is that parents in post-industrial, western societies face an often 
overwhelming array of advice on how to bring up their children (see for example 
Dekker 2010; Edwards and Gillies 2004; Furedi 2001; Phoenix et al. 1991; 
Schaubroeck 2010, to name but a few). At the same time, there have been several 
philosophical treatments of the legal, moral and political issues surrounding issues 
of procreation, the rights of children and the duties of parents (see Archard 1993; 
Blustein 1982; Brighouse and Swift 2006; O’Neil and Ruddick 1979), as well as 
some philosophical accounts of the shifts in our underlying conceptualisation of 
childhood and adult-child relationships (see Kennedy 2006; Stables 2008). While 
this book partly builds on the insights of this literature, we see our project here as 
significantly different in that it offers a philosophically informed discussion of the 
actual practical experience of being a parent, with its deliberations, judgements and 
dilemmas. As philosophers of education, we are part of a tradition of rich and rigor-
ous thinking and writing on questions such as what it means to educate children, the 
nature of human flourishing, the idea of introducing children into a common world, 
preparing them for an independent and fulfilling life and the significance of intimate 
relationships. However, while we are indebted to the thinkers and writers who have 
addressed these questions, many of whose insights are reflected in this book, we feel 
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that the parent-child relationship and its educational significance is an area that has 
not been sufficiently addressed by philosophers. In probing the ethical and con-
ceptual questions suggested by this relationship, we hope to open up a space for 
thinking about childrearing and the parent-child relationship beyond and other than 
in terms of the languages which dominate the ways in which we generally think 
about it today. The central premise of the book is that childrearing and the parent-
child relationship are ethical all the way down. Though this may seem like a fairly 
obvious thing to say since, surely, there is nothing new in asserting the ethical 
significance of raising children, we feel it is important, especially today, to start by 
affirming this point because articulating what exactly is meant by the phrase ‘ethical 
all the way down’ is a project that, we believe, gets to the heart of the experience 
of being a parent in contemporary conditions, while at the same time exposing 
the limitations of some of the languages within which contemporary ‘parenting’ is 
conceptualised and discussed.
Following from this, then, the book has two central strands. The first is to offer 
an account of what it means to be a parent so as to capture the complexity of that 
experience in contemporary conditions. We develop this account in dialogue with 
contemporary discourses in a way that will enable us to offer a conceptualisation of 
the parent-child relationship that goes beyond what we see as the often narrow and 
impoverished ways in which this relationship is conceptualised in popular and 
scientific discussions. The first stage of this project thus consists of exploring the 
languages and conceptual landscape that have come to characterise much contem-
porary discussion of ‘parenting’. As stated above, we explore this language and its 
significance in detail in Chap. 1, although its features and manifestations involve 
themes that we revisit and discuss throughout the entire book. While we do not want 
to suggest that our identification of or indeed our critique of this language is entirely 
new or original, we do believe that the perspective we develop in the following 
chapters sheds new light on this area. Some objections to contemporary policy and 
popular discourses of ‘parenting’ take the form of problematising the use of the 
term ‘skills’ within policy and practice aimed at supporting parents; others reflect a 
scepticism about the very viability of the project of articulating a normative account 
of ‘good parenting’; others, while acknowledging the potential defensibility and 
value of such an account, are concerned with the possibly damaging consequences 
of attemp ting to implement it in a top-down, state policy context. What we want 
to suggest here is that articulating reservations about various prescriptive accounts 
or interventions on the part of the government and its agencies does not really 
resolve any of the philosophical questions raised by the parent-child relationship 
and its place in contemporary culture. On the contrary, the more we probe these 
questions, the more we come to feel that ethical and conceptual issues come into the 
discussion at all levels.
In discussing the problems we are facing today, in a climate of increasing 
government intervention in family life, Paul Smeyers expresses the hope that his 
analysis will enable people
to foster recognition that the practice of parenting involves complex considerations that 
exceed simple articulation within a discourse of skills, of effectiveness and output, as well 
as of risk and control, and within a particular sense of rights. (Smeyers 2010, p. 283)
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In the chapters to come, what we are doing is, in fact, articulating and discussing 
just such complexities, their significance and the myriad ways in which they are 
manifested in the day-to-day experiences of parents raising their children. While 
one could see this approach as one of offering an account of ‘parenting’ from 
a philosophical perspective, we find this description a bit misleading as we do 
not understand our project to be one of developing ‘a philosophical perspective on 
parenting’, or a distinct philosophical position from which we (then) try to analyse 
the experience of being a parent. This is true both in the sense that the philosophical 
elements of our discussion emerge from, and are intertwined with, other, existing 
accounts (philosophical or otherwise) of ‘parenting’, and in the sense that we do not 
find it helpful to situate ourselves within a particular philosophical tradition. 
Throughout the process of writing this book and the discussions that preceded it, we 
have found ourselves drawing on a variety of philosophical sources, combining and 
integrating insights, and making use of the tensions between different perspectives, 
in an effort to make sense of the claims of parenting – in all senses of this phrase – 
today. Yet while not perhaps offering a distinct philosophical position on parenting, 
our discussion throughout the book does reflect our conviction that it is impossible 
to say anything about the experience of being a parent without this inevitably being, 
to some degree, philosophical in nature.
Our way into this discussion involves the recognition that part of the very attempt 
to say something about the parent-child relationship must come from within the 
relationship itself. In explaining and articulating just what it would mean to ask 
questions about the parent-child relationship from the inside, as it were, we develop 
and draw on a distinction between the first-person and the third-person perspective. 
This distinction, again, while connected to existing philosophical work, is used here 
in a particular way, as discussed primarily in Chap. 2. Crucially, it is through pro-
bing and exploring the insights yielded by what we refer to as the first-person per-
spective, articulated throughout the following chapters by means of both philosophical 
analysis and discussion of ‘thick’ examples, that we draw attention to some signifi-
cant aspects of the parent-child relationship that, we believe, are all too frequently 
overlooked or obscured in today’s climate.
The second strand in the book is, alongside and as part of the attempt to articulate 
an account of the ethical and conceptual complexities involved in being a parent in 
contemporary conditions, a defence of a perspective on the parent-child relationship 
in which the political significance of this relationship, and of the family in general, 
is reaffirmed and valued, albeit in a very different sense from that which charac-
terises a great deal of familiar contemporary discussion on the politics of parenting. 
Specifically, we offer an account of being a parent that reconceptualises the family 
as a site of political action and reflection in a way that goes beyond the narrow sense 
of ‘politics’ that characterises those critical discourses that are suspicious of govern-
ment intervention in family life. This account is explicitly discussed in Chap. 6, 
although the possibilities and potential suggested by different, philosophically 
informed and possibly less restrictive notions of the political form part of our 
general approach of probing and challenging the words and concepts we use to 
describe what parents do and should be doing with and for their children, and of 
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suggesting other languages with which to describe and explore this central area of 
our lives as individuals and as a society. It is precisely this current use of language 
and its pervasive effects throughout public discussions of ‘parenting’ that, we argue, 
stands in the way of spelling out what exactly it means to say that childrearing and 
the parent-child relationship are ethical all the way down.
It is probably worth stating at the outset that our aims, as articulated above, may 
be seen as fairly modest and may even seem somewhat disappointing if one expects 
‘aims’ to lead to specified ‘outcomes’. In writing this book, we do not wish to 
inform policy in the direct sense of the term; nor do we want to say that current 
policy is simply ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’. If anything, what we hope to achieve is that 
anyone involved in helping parents, setting out directives for those helping parents, 
or producing policy guidelines in the field of parent support, will exercise far more 
caution in doing so. We are not arguing that offering parents advice on how to bring 
up their children is a bad thing in and of itself and should thus be generally aban-
doned. What we wish to convey is something that, in a sense, goes beyond the 
question of whether or not parents ‘need’ expert advice, and whether or not it is 
appropriate or even acceptable to give them such advice about raising their children. 
Our point is that whatever it is that is communicated to parents through such advice 
does not, and cannot, capture the complexity involved in raising one’s children; that 
is, it does not, and cannot, capture the complexity of the ethical issues and questions 
that are inevitably bound up with being a parent. To put this differently, while there 
is undoubtedly a role for advice to parents, this does not trump personal judgement 
and personal responsibility. Importantly, though, in saying this, we are not just 
referring to personal judgement and responsibility in the sense of assessing the 
applicability of the advice in question to a particular situation with its unique 
features – in other words, this is not simply a version of the familiar philosophical 
point about what is entailed in applying a rule; rather, what we want to draw attention 
to is the unique meaning and value of personal judgement and responsibility within 
the context of the parent-child relationship; within the context of the question of 
what is important for me, here, now, in relation to my child.1 This theme will recur 
at several points throughout the book, but it is addressed explicitly in Chaps. 2, 5 
and 6. It also connects to our central argument that it is not sufficient to just demand 
that we reject the mass of expert advice and instate something else in its place 
(‘muddling through’, maternal instinct, intuitions), since this, again, fails to address 
the particular ethical complexities of the parent-child relationship (see especially 
Chaps. 3 and 6 for a discussion of this point). In short, we do not claim, nor would 
we aspire, to be offering a full account of the parent-child relationship, but we see our 
work as a contribution to an ongoing and multidisciplinary discussion of these issues; 
a discussion in which, so we argue, the kind of perspectives we articulate here have 
been all too frequently ignored.
1 It is important to note that we do not intend with this phrase, which we use frequently throughout 
the book, to ascribe any special status to biological parents, as opposed to adoptive parents.
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Given this perspective, we hope that the book will contribute to discussions of 
parents and families within various disciplinary arenas and by various different 
audiences. The critical line we develop here does, we think, suggest important 
insights for two broad audiences. The first such audience is that of policy makers in 
the field of ‘parenting’, parenting support practitioners, parent practitioner trainers 
and maybe even teacher educators, who may all, in one way or another, draw on 
theoretical work on families, children and parents that, our account suggests, is 
often not broad enough. In other words, the assumptions, logic and language of this 
work tends to obscure significant ethical, existential and political dimensions of the 
parent-child relationship. The second such audience is that of philosophers of 
education, political philosophers and moral philosophers writing about families, 
parents and children, where often, the theoretical perspectives and conceptual 
frameworks drawn on and articulated are in a sense too broad, in that the parent-
child relationship is frequently treated as a subcategory of moral relationships or an 
instance of a tension within political or moral theory, and thus not considered as a 
relationship with its own unique ethical and philosophical significance.
It seems necessary, in a book on this topic, to address the issue of gender. While we 
do not want to ignore the importance of this issue, we do not discuss it syste matically 
in the following chapters. Specifically, we will speak about parents and parent-child 
relationships, not about fathers, or mothers, and their relationship with their children. 
By doing so, we do not want to deny that there are differences between the experi-
ences of mothers and those of fathers, nor that any first-person experience of being a 
parent is, amongst other things, always an embodied experience in which issues of sex 
and gender cannot but play a part. But focusing on this aspect of the experience and 
positioning of mothers and fathers and their different relationships with their children 
would, we feel, detract from our central concern here, which is to articulate what it is 
that is at stake in what we refer to as the first-person perspective of being a parent, as 
against what we refer to as a third-person perspective. As we hope will become clear 
throughout the book, in taking the lens of the first-person perspective, what is fore-
grounded is not so much one’s experience as a member of a particular gender, but 
one’s experience as a parent, here and now, in relation to one’s own child.
In developing our own account, we acknowledge a debt to the kind of experiential 
accounts by women that have played such an integral part in the feminist struggle, 
whereby women’s first-person articulation of their everyday experience (as opposed 
to third-person accounts of the legal, political or socio-economic status of women in 
society) served as a way of exposing the conceptual and ethical assumptions under-
pinning the conceptualisation of categories such as ‘woman’, ‘wife’ and ‘mother’, 
and thus of challenging the political power structures that were reproduced within 
the family and other intimate relationships. As Sarah Ruddick put this in 1989: 
‘Maternal voices have been drowned by professional theory, ideologies of mother-
hood, sexist arrogance, and childhood fantasy’ (Ruddick 1989, p. 40), and her own 
work belongs to the tradition of reclaiming a voice – ‘naming the nameless so that 
it can be thought’ (Lorde, quoted in Ruddick 1989, p. 40) – championed by feminist 
writers and multicultural theorists. In a sense, what we are doing here can be seen as 
revisiting this approach in the light of current discourses which, on the face of it, no 
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longer seem to embody such a blatantly universalising, oppressive language that 
ignores mothers and their experience. Yet while acknowledging that it might, at times, 
matter very much in one’s experience of being a parent to one’s child that one is 
the mother, and not the father, of that child, and vice versa, it does not necessarily, 
on our account, have to matter, or to determine the experience. As we will argue 
later, to take the first-person perspective in thinking about parenting is to acknowl-
edge a radical pluralism when it comes to the experience of being a parent; which is 
also to acknowledge that there is no self-evident way to identify a set of experiences 
and actions that determine what it means to be a parent; rather, what it means to be a 
parent will have to be decided and, in a sense, claimed for anew in every instance.
A similar point applies to issues of social class. We are acutely aware of the fact 
that in speaking in the first-person throughout this book, we are speaking as 
members of a particular social class in a particular developed part of the world. 
However, while not wishing to play down the significance of this point, we do want 
to insist that in trying to understand the parent-child relationship from the first-
person perspective, the matter of there being differences between social classes, in 
a sense, disappears, since what is at stake is not one’s experience as a member of 
this or that class, but to repeat the point made above, one’s experience as a parent, 
here and now, in relation to one’s own child. This does not preclude one’s belonging 
to a particular class being highly significant in one’s experience of being a parent, 
but it should not, we argue, become a narrative in its own right, as in doing so it 
would in a sense function as a type of third-person account, thus possibly silencing 
the first-person account of being a parent.
A note on methodology may be appropriate here. It is notoriously difficult for 
philosophers to talk of methodology in their work, and we share the distaste of many 
of our colleagues for the use of this term. Nevertheless, a few words are in order here. 
In a sense, we take ourselves to be doing something closely related to what Wittgenstein 
says about ‘supplying remarks on the natural history of human beings’:
What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are 
not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which 
have escaped remark because they are always before our eyes. (Wittgenstein, PI, I, # 415)
What we are trying to foreground and to expose in our discussion, particularly in 
Chap. 1, is what has become natural to us today in relation to childrearing and the 
parent-child relationship; so natural, in fact, that we seem to hardly even notice it 
anymore. We take ourselves to be ‘supplying remarks’ on what has, in recent years, 
become part of our nature when it comes to childrearing and the parent-child rela-
tionship. We do this mainly through presenting and discussing several detailed 
examples. To a certain extent, this may come close to what in another field of study 
is called a history of the present:
Studies of the history of the present start from an unease with the values of the present, and 
by historicizing and denaturalizing the taken-for-granted notions, practices, and values of 
the present, such studies can open up a space out from which one can revise and reformulate 
other possible ways of reasoning and practicing pedagogy. […] research within a history of 
the present can be seen as a form of critical engagement of the present, as making the pro-
duction of discourses open for scrutiny and denaturalization also makes them open for 
revisions. (Dahlberg 2003, p. 262)
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Thus Dahlberg examines, for example, ‘what kind of ethic the norm of autonomy 
embodies’ (Dahlberg 2003, p. 262). By historicising and denaturalising the way the 
norm of autonomy currently works, she hopes to destabilise the present, which in 
turn would enable one ‘to explore if there are other possible ways of conceptualis-
ing the child, teacher and pedagogy than in terms of the norm of autonomy’ 
(Dahlberg 2003, p. 262). In a sense, this approach describes what we will be doing 
throughout the book.
Finally, a note on language. Firstly, we have chosen throughout this work to use, 
where possible, the gender-neutral term ‘parent’ or ‘parents’ rather than ‘father’ or 
‘mother’. This is largely because, as indicated in the above discussion of gender, in our 
analysis of our contemporary linguistic and conceptual landscape, we wish to draw 
attention to other, non-gendered aspects of the discourse and practice of ‘parenting’. 
However, in doing so, we are not trying to ignore the point that, as Ruddick warns, ‘To 
speak of “parenting” obscures [the historical fact that] […] even now, and certainly 
through most of history, women have been the mothers’ (Ruddick 1989, p. 45). This 
point notwithstanding, we generally use the feminine pronoun ‘she’ to refer to the par-
ent in our examples. This is in order to avoid the clumsy, gender-neutral alternatives.
Secondly, though this might at first sight be a bit confusing to the English-
speaking reader, we use the expression ‘the pedagogical relationship’ at several 
points throughout the book. This is a literal translation of the Dutch term ‘pedago-
gische relatie’, and it is important to note that the term ‘pedagogical’ here has a far 
broader sense than the narrow, somewhat didactic connotations of the word as it is 
commonly used, in English, in the context of discussions of teaching. Although 
appropriately applied to teachers, the original Dutch term also refers to parents and, 
importantly, it denotes something like the development of the child, in a sense that 
goes beyond the narrow notion of teaching. The concept ‘pedagogical relationship’ 
was actually introduced some time ago into Anglo-Saxon philosophy of educa-
tion by Ben Spiecker, although it has had limited consequent usage amongst 
English-speaking philosophers in the field. In his 1984 article The pedagogical 
relationship, Spiecker conceptually developed the idea of the pedagogical relation-
ship as foundational in educational theory, especially in the ‘geisteswissen-
schaftliche’ tradition. For Spiecker, the pedagogical relationship is, in its most 
general formu lation, that particular relationship within which a child can become a 
person (Spiecker 1984, p. 208). Put in this general way, a number of particular 
kinds of relationships count as pedagogical relationships: the relationship between 
parent and child, between teacher and pupil, between master and apprentice, etc. 
since in all of these relationships a child can come to develop as a person, or can 
come to develop aspects of what (at a particular given time) is meant by ‘person’. 
The relationship between parent and child is probably the archetypical instance of 
that relationship in which children can grow up to become persons given the (gener-
ally) long-term relationship between parents and their children. To complicate mat-
ters even further, there is in Dutch another concept used to speak about the 
relationship between parents and their children in as far as this concerns the process 
of what is commonly referred to as bringing up or raising children: opvoeding-
srelatie. Literally translated, this would be something like ‘childrearing relationship’. 
xvIntroduction
This is clearly a concept that is not used in the English language. In English, the 
concept most commonly used in this context is ‘parent-child relationship’ – and this 
is, in fact, the concept that we generally employ throughout the book, in preference to 
the more common term ‘parenting’.
As regards the word ‘parenting’ itself, although this word is now part of everyday 
English, it is not, we argue, either ‘innocent’ or ordinary since it is expressive of a 
shift in our way of thinking and speaking about childrearing and the parent-child 
relationship.2 Part of our project of denaturalising this usage could be read as an 
attempt to recover the now somewhat unfashionable English term ‘upbringing’. 
While this older term is obviously not without its own problematic evaluative 
connotations, the currently pervasive term ‘parenting’ epitomises the particular 
understanding of childrearing and the parent-child relationship as pervaded by 
scientific knowledge and the need for expertise that forms the focus of our discussion 
in Chap. 1 and the rest of the book.
To reflect these insights, the term ‘parenting’ appears in inverted commas within 
this Introduction and in Chap. 1, but will appear without them in the subsequent 
chapters. Although the reader may find this a little annoying, we believe it is justified 
as what we want to highlight in these chapters is the ways in which the very usage 
of this term has contributed to common assumptions and implications about the 
meaning, nature and significance of the parent-child relationship.
In summary, and to follow on from the above points, one way to express what we 
are trying to do through this book is to say that we are trying to speak and to encour-
age the speaking of other languages – other, that is, than the ones that hold us captive 
through the ways in which we conceptualise and speak about childrearing and the 
parent-child relationship. This is not an attempt to construct a ‘new’ language, but, 
rather, an attempt to voice an ‘old’ one. Or better yet, it is an attempt to (re)introduce 
certain words into our ways of conceptualising childrearing and the parent-child rela-
tionship that are perhaps bound to be perceived as ‘old’, or even, perhaps, as ‘philo-
sophical’ or ‘esoteric’ – but nonetheless words, we think, that allow us to shed a 
different light on what childrearing is, or could be, and what it means, or could mean, 
to be in a relationship with one’s own child. This is not to be understood as just reviv-
ing or invoking the old meaning of these words and taking them as authoritative, but 
rather using these words here and now, in contemporary contexts, allowing the fric-
tion between these words and our current taken-for-granted terms and conceptualisa-
tions to work in such ways as to generate a different understanding of childrearing 
and the parent-child relationship. Such a move might, we hope, not only inspire us to 
rethink certain practical issues such as the very notion of advice and support for par-
ents, but help to reframe the central area of our lives that is the parent-child relation-
ship as a fundamentally moral and political aspect of human social practice.
2 For an illuminating discussion of the historical origins and context of this usage, see Smith (2010).
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